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Abstrat
This paper ompares the outomes of two three-stage games of two rms
ompeting for quantity with managerial delegation. In fat, we prove that
simultaneous hoie of managers by the proprietors of the rms followed by
Stakelberg-type ompetition is equivalent to sequential hoie of managers fol-
lowed by Cournot-type ompetition. We prove equivalene in a general setting,
namely, when the duopolisti model is haraterised by a non-linear inverse
demand funtion of the form p
i
= a  (q
i
)
n
  (q
j
)
n
, i; j = 1; 2 and n  1.
Keywords: Strategi delegation; Cournot ompetition; Sta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JEL Classiation: D43, L13, L21
1 Introdution
In modern day orporation praties the adoption of a managing shemewhere owners
delegate deision powers to managers is widely adopted and onsidered as standard.
Traditionally, the owner of a rm strives to stimulate the aggressiveness of his manager
by ommitting to an inentive ontrat rewarding the manager's performane based
on a ombination of fators suh as market share, output and/or prots.
The role of strategi delegation in oligopoly was rst investigated by the works
of Fershtman and Judd (1985), Vikers (1985) and Sklivas (1987). They based their
investigation on the study of two-stage omplete information games. In the rst stage,
the owners of eah rm publily announe the rewarding shemes put forward to their
managers, while in the seond stage, rms' managers ompete for quantities or pries,
aording to delegated objetive funtions.
e-mail address: njmunipi.gr (tel.: +30210 4142289)
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The eets of strategi delegation on the standard ompetition models of indus-
trial eonomis suh as the Cournot and Stakelberg models is a topi of inreased
interest to both sholars and pratitioners and the results have the potential to guide
regulation.
In their 2008 paper Kopel and Loer (2008) onsider a duopoly game where the
two rms are in a Stakelberg-leader-follower-type situation. Amongst other things,
they examine whether the market leader sustains her advantage if at a stage prior
to quantity deisions the owners of the rms are given the ability to hoose their
delegation shemes.
The urrent paper elaborates further on the ideas rst developed in the above
paper and Stamatopoulos's (2013) pre-print that was privately ommuniated to us.
We examine and ompare the outomes of two three-stage omplete information games
that both involve managerial delegation by means of a weighted ontrat rewarding
prots and quantity prior to quantity ompetition. In the rst stage of the rst
game, the G-game, the owners of the rst rm ommit on the inentive rate of their
managerial ontrat. In the seond stage, the owners of the seond rm reat making
up their mind with regards to the inentive rate of their manager. In the third stage of
the G-game, the managers of the two rms ompete for quantity in a Cournot fashion.
In the rst stage of the H-game the two owners make simultaneous oers to their
managers. In the seond stage, the manager of the rst rm ats as a leader setting
a quantity level and in the third stage of the H-game the manager of the seond
ompany reats aordingly gauging her output level. We prove that equilibrium
pries and quantities are the same for the two games. Further, we show that the
rst mover in the sequential delegation game, the G-game, earns the same prot
as the seond mover in the sequential quantity game, the H-game. Similarly, the
seond mover of the delegation game ahieves the same prot as the rst mover in
the quantity game.
We, further, ontribute to the literature by onsidering a duopoly market of a
dierentiated ommodity haraterized by a non-linear inverse demand funtion. To
overome the potential restritiveness of linear sale urves while, at the same time,
exploring the limits of our onsiderations we onsider an inverse demand funtion of
the form p
i
= a (q
i
)
n
 (q
j
)
n
where p
i
is i's market prie and q
i
and q
j
with i; j = 1; 2
are the quantities produed by the two rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the model and the results are found
in setion 2, setion 3 sheds light into the heuristis of the result, setion 4 derives
Stamatopoulos' (2013) linear demand ase followed by a brief onlusion in setion 5.
All tehnial details are olleted in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a duopoly market with dierentiated ommodities. Firm i faes the inverse
demand funtion p
i
= a   f(q
i
)   f(q
j
) where p
i
is i's market prie, q
i
and q
j
2
are the quantities produed by rms i and j, with i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j, f : R
+
!
R
+
a homogeneous funtion of degree n 2 N and  2 (0; 1℄. The ost funtion is
assumed to be linear, the same for both rms. Let, further,  with  < a denote
the marginal prodution ost. Firms follow a orporate struture haraterized by
ownership-management separation. Following Vikers (1985), we assume that the
managers are oered objetive funtions that are ombinations of prot and quantity
sold. The manager of rm i is thus delegated the objetive funtion
v
i
(q
1
; q
2
) = (p
i
  )q
i
+ a
i
q
i
; a
i
 0; i = 1; 2
The total payo of manager i is given by 
i
v
i
+ t
i
. Parameters 
i
and t
i
do not aet
the hoie of quantities and are hosen by the rm's owners to just give the manager
his reservation utility. The inentive rate a
i
is hosen by the owners of rm i so that
they maximize the prot funtion

i
(q
1
; q
2
) = (p
i
  )q
i
; i = 1; 2
The G-game is strutured as follows: in the rst stage, the owners of rm 1
deide on the inentive rate of their manager, a
1
: The owners of rm 2 observe the
oer of the rst rm and in stage two they reat by hoosing a
2
: Finally, in stage three
the managers of the two rms ompete seleting quantities q
1
and q
2
in a Cournot
fashion.
The struture of the H-game is as follows: in the rst stage the owners of the
two rms simultaneously hoose a
1
and a
2
making their hoies publily known. In
the seond stage, the manager of the rst rm sets a level of quantity and in the third
stage, the manager of the seond rm reats by seleting an optimum level of quantity
for her rm.
As usually the two games are solved by bakward indution. Let q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
); q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
)
denote the quantities solving the Cournot sub-game played at stage 3 of the G-game.
If we denote by 
i
(a
1
; a
2
) = 
i
(q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
); q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
)), i = 1; 2 the prot funtions of
the two owners respetively then, in stage two, the owners of the seond rm selet
a
2
by solving max
a
2
0

2
(a
1
; a
2
). Let a
2
(a
1
) denote their hoie. Then, in the rst stage,
the owners of the rst rm solve the problem max
a
1
0

1
(a
1
; a
2
(a
1
)). Let, further, a
G
i
and
p
G
i
denote the equilibrium inentive rate and produt prie of rm i in the G-game,
i = 1; 2. Then,
a
G
1
=
n(n + 1)
2


1
(n+ 1)

(a  ) ;
a
G
2
=
n(n+ 1)(n + 1  )
2

  n
2
(n+ 1)
5


1
(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1  
2
)

(a  ) ;
p
G
1
=
n(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  )(n+ 1  
2
)

[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  )
3
+ n(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)
2

2


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  )
+
 n
2
(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )
3

 + n
3
(n+ 1)
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1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  ) ;
p
G
2
=
n(n + 1)
3
(n+ 1  )(n+ 1   
2
)

[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1  
2
)

(a  )
+
 n
2
(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)
3


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1  
2
)

(a  )
+
 n(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )(n+ 1   
2
)
2

 + n
2
(n+ 1)(n + 1  
2
)
5


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  ) ;
where


1
= (n+ 1  )[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄[(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)  n
3
℄ ;
and

 = [(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
) + n
4
℄[(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
2
  n
2

4
℄ :
The preise alulations for the above formulae an be found in the Appendix.
Similarly, with respet to the H-game, at stage three the manager of rm 2
responds to the quantity level q
1
(a
1
; a
2
) set by the manager of rm 1 at stage two, by
solving the maximization problemmax
q
2
0
u
2
(q
1
; q
2
). If we denote by r
2
(q
1
) the solution to
this problem, at stage two the manager of rm 1 solves the problem max
q
1
u
1
(q
1
; r
2
(q
1
))
where
u
1
(q
1
; r
2
(q
1
)) = (a  f(q
1
)  f(r
2
(q
1
))  )q
1
+ a
1
q
1
:
If q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
) denotes the solution to this problem and q
H
2
(a
1
; a
2
) = r
2
(q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
)) then,
at stage one the owners of rms 1 and 2 simultaneously solve the respetive problems
max
a
1

1
(q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
); q
H
2
(a
1
; a
2
)) and max
a
2

2
(q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
); q
H
2
(a
1
; a
2
)). Let a
H
i
and p
H
i
de-
note the equilibrium inentive rate and produt prie of rm 2 in H-game. Again,
the preise alulations an be found in the Appendix,
a
H
1
= 0 ; a
H
2
=
[(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄n(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1)[(n+ 1)
2
  (2n + 1)
2
℄[(n+ 1)
2
  n
2
℄
(a  ) ;
p
H
1
=
(n + 1)[n(n+ 1)
2
  n(n+ 1)( + 1) + n
3
℄

(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
+
 n
2
(n+ 1)(n + 1  
2
)
3


1
(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  ) ;
p
H
2
=
n(n+ 1)[(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄

(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
+
n(n+ 1)[(2n + 1)
2
  (n+ 1)
2
℄
2


1
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  ) :
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Putting everything together, we get
Theorem 2.1 For games G and H the following hold true:
(i) a
G
1
= a
H
2
> a
G
2
> a
H
1
= 0.
(ii) p
G
1
= p
H
2
, p
G
2
= p
H
1
and q
G
1
= q
H
2
, q
G
2
= q
H
1
.
(iii) 
G
1
= 
H
2
> 
G
2
= 
H
1
:
Proof. The details of the proof are inluded in the Appendix.
3 The intuition behind the result
In analyzing the main result, Theorem 2.1, we follow the reasoning presented rst in
[Kopel and Loer (2008)℄ and subsequently in [Stamatopoulos (2014)℄.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2.1 follow readily from part (i) of the same
theorem. The H-game follows similar lines to those of the orresponding game in
[Kopel and Loer (2008)℄. It is, therefore, not surprising that the leader, the owner
of rm 1 in this ase, has no inentive to delegate, i.e. a
H
1
= 0 while the follower,
rm 2, does have an inentive to delegate deision power to a manager. This result is
diretly derived in the Appendix.
The rest of the main theorem follows from the fat that a
G
1
= a
H
2
; i.e., the
inentive rate of the rst mover in the delegation sub-game of G is equal to the
inentive rate of the seond mover in the quantity sub-game of H. In onsisteny
with the notation used in setion 2, let q
G
1
(a
1
) = q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
(a
1
)) denote the equilibrium
quantity of rm 1 in theG-game as a funtion of a
1
, i.e. the inentive rate delegated to
the manager of rm 1 being the rst mover in the orresponding delegation sub-game.
A diret appliation of the hain rule allows for the splitting of the rate of hange of
q
G
1
(a
1
) into two summands as follows:
dq
G
1
da
1
=
q
G
1
a
1
| {z }
diret eet
+
q
G
1
a
2
da
2
(a
1
)
da
1
| {z }
indiret eet
:(3.0.1)
In a similar fashion, the rate of hange of q
H
2
(a
2
) = q
H
2
(a
2
; q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
)) as a funtion of
a
2
an be split
dq
H
2
da
2
=
q
H
2
a
2
| {z }
diret eet
+
q
H
2
q
1
q
H
1
a
2
| {z }
indiret eet
(3.0.2)
Equations (3.0.1) and (3.0.2) deompose the eet of own delegation inentive on own
performane into the diret eet measuring the immediate impat of a
1
on q
G
1
and
a
2
on q
H
2
respetively and the indiret eet measuring the orresponding impat via
5
the opponent's response. Given our framework, it turns out that both diret as well
as indiret eets are mutually equal. Further, if we let q
G
2
(a
1
) = q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
(a
1
)) and
q
H
1
(a
2
) = q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
dq
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
(a
1
))
da
1
=
dq
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
da
2
(3.0.3)
is also true.
4 A \linear" example
Consider the ase where the inverse demand funtion is given by
p
i
(q
1
; q
2
) = a  q
i
  q
j
with i 6= j; i; j 2 f1; 2g and marginal ost  < a.
We, rst, look at the G-game. The quantities hosen in the Cournot stage are
q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
) =
(2  )(a  ) + 2a
1
  a
2
4  
2
; q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
) =
(2  )(a  ) + 2a
2
  a
1
4  
2
:
At stage 2, the reation funtion of the follower, i.e. the owner of rm 2, is
a
2
(a
1
) =

2
(2  )(a  )  
3
a
1
4(2  
2
)
:
In equilibrium,
a
G
1
=

2


1


(a  ); a
G
2
=
(2   )
2

   
5


1
4(2   
2
)

(a  ); a
G
1
> a
G
2
where 

1
= (2  )(4  
2
)[4(2  
2
)  
3
℄ and 
 = [8(2  
2
) + 
4
℄[4(2  
2
)
2
  
4
℄.
Equilibrium pries and quantities in terms of 
 and 

1
for rm 1 are given by
p
G
1
=
"
2(2   )[4(2  
2
)  
3
℄

8(2   
2
)(4  
2
)

+
2
2
[
4
  4(2   
2
)
2
℄

1
8(2   
2
)(4  
2
)

#
(a  )
q
G
1
=
"
(2   )[4(2  
2
)  
3
℄

4(2   
2
)(4  
2
)

+

2
[8(2  
2
) + 
4
℄

1
4(2   
2
)(4  
2
)

#
(a  ) ;
while for rm 2 are given by
p
G
2
=
"
2(2   )(2  
2
)(4  
2
)

8(2   
2
)(4   
2
)

+
2(2   
2
)
3
(
2
  4)

1
8(2   
2
)(4   
2
)

#
(a  )
q
G
2
=
"
2(2   )(4  
2
)

4(2   
2
)(4  
2
)

+
2
3
(
2
  4)

1
4(2   
2
)(4  
2
)

#
(a  ) :
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We, then, onsider the H-game. Quantities in the last two stages are given by
q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
) =
(2   )(a  )  a
2
+ 2a
1
2(2   
2
)
and
q
H
2
(a
1
; a
2
) =
a  + a
2
  q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
2
=
(4  2   
2
)(a  )  2a
1
+ (4   
2
)a
2
4(2  
2
)
:
In the delegation stage we have
a
H
1
= 0 ; a
H
2
=

2


1


(a  ) = a
G
1
In addition, it is straightforward to show that p
H
2
= p
G
1
and p
H
1
= p
G
2
showing further,
that 
H
2
= 
G
1
and 
H
1
= 
G
2
:
5 Conlusion
This paper fouses on a omparative study of the lassial ompetition models of
Cournot and Stakelberg when poliy deisions are taken by managers. We have
proved that sequential delegation under Cournot quantity ompetition and simulta-
neous delegation under Stakelberg quantity ompetition produe the same market
outomes. In this given framework, pries and quantities are found to be idential
for these two modes of ompetition. Further, being the rst mover in the delegation
game under the rst framework is equivalent -in terms of prots- to being the seond
mover in the quantity game under the seond. A similar equality holds between the
prots of the seond mover in the delegation game and the prots of the rst mover
in the quantity game. The result ould be proved in an even more general setting
that of an inverse demand funtion of the form p
i
= a   (q
i
)
n
  (q
j
)
m
where p
i
is
i's market prie and q
i
and q
j
with i; j = 1; 2 are the quantities produed by the two
rms.
Whether a similar result an be derived for the ase of more than two rms is a
question for future researh.
6 Appendix
We rst prove a lemma
Lemma 6.1 Let f(q) be a non-negative real, dierentiable funtion, f : R
+
! R
+
.
The funtion f is homogeneous if and only if qf
0
(q) = nf(q), for some n 2 N.
7
Proof. It is a known exerise to show that if f is homogeneous f(q) = Cq
n
for some
C > 0 and n 2 N. A straightforward hek proves qf
0
(q) = nf(q).
To prove the onverse,
qf
0
(q) = nf(q) )
f
0
(q)
f(q)
=
n
q
)
Z
f
0
(q)
f(q)
dq =
Z
n
q
dq ) f(q) = Cq
n
and f is homogeneous.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: We fous rst at the G-game. At the third stage of the
game the managers of the two rms ompete for quantities a la Cournot. The solution
of the system
#u
1
#q
1
= 0 ;
#u
2
#q
2
= 0
gives
f(q
1
) =
a  + a
1
  f(q
2
)
n+ 1
; f(q
2
) =
a  + a
2
  f(q
1
)
n+ 1
whih implies that the quantities hosen at stage 3 as funtions of the inentive oef-
ients a
1
; a
2
are given by
q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
) = f
 1
 
(n+ 1   )(a  ) + (n+ 1)a
1
  a
2
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
!
(6.1.1)
and
q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
) = f
 1
 
(n+ 1   )(a  ) + (n+ 1)a
2
  a
1
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
!
:(6.1.2)
At stage 2, the owners of rm 2 hoose a
2
so that to maximise their prot

2
(a
1
; a
2
) = (a  f(q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
))  f(q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
))  )q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
) :
We know by Lemma 6.1 that for i; j = 1; 2
#q
i
#a
j
=
q
i
nf(q
i
)
#
#a
j
f(q
i
) =
q
i
nf(q
i
)
n+ 1
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
:(6.1.3)
In solving
#
2
#a
2
= 0 we take into aount (6.1.3) for i = j = 2 to get
(

2
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
 
n+ 1
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
)f(q
2
) + (a  f(q
1
)  f(q
2
)  )
1
n
n+ 1
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
= 0
whih yields a
2
as a funtion of a
1
a
2
(a
1
) =
n(n+ 1   )
2
(a  )  n
3
a
1
(n+ 1)
2
(n + 1  
2
)
:(6.1.4)
At stage 1, the owners of rm 1 maximise their prot

1
(a
1
) = (a  f(q
G
1
(a
1
))  f(q
G
2
(a
1
))q
G
1
(a
1
) :
8
where q
G
1
(a
1
) = q
G
1
(a
1
; a
2
(a
1
)) and q
G
2
(a
1
) = q
G
2
(a
1
; a
2
(a
1
)). Plugging the value of a
2
of equation (6.1.4) into equations (6.1.1) and (6.1.2) respetively we get
f(q
G
1
(a
1
)) =
(n + 1  )[(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)  n
3
℄(a  )
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
2
(n + 1  
2
)
+
[(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
) + n
4
℄a
1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
and
f(q
G
2
(a
1
)) =
(n+ 1)(n + 1  )[(n+ 1)(n+ 1   
2
) + n
2
℄(a  )
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
2
(n + 1  
2
)
+
 (n+ 1)[(n+ 1)(n+ 1   
2
) + n
3
℄a
1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
:
Solving
d
1
(a
1
)
da
1
= 0 gives
a
G
1
=
n(n+ 1)
2


1
(n+ 1)

(a  ) ;(6.1.5)
a
G
2
=
n(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )
2

   n
2
(n+ 1)
5


1
(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  ) ;(6.1.6)
with


1
= (n+ 1  )[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄[(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)  n
3
℄ ;
and

 = [(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
) + n
4
℄[(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
2
  n
2

4
℄ :
We, now, ome to the H-game. At stage 3, the manager of rm 2 solves the
problem
max
q
2
0
u
2
(q
1
:q
2
) = max
q
2
0
[(a  f(q
1
)  f(q
2
)  )q
2
+ a
2
q
2
℄
to nd the response funtion
f(q
2
(q
1
)) =
a  + a
2
  f(q
1
)
n+ 1
(6.1.7)
or equivalently, sine by Lemma 6.1 f is 1{1,
q
2
(q
1
) = f
 1
 
a  + a
2
  f(q
1
)
n+ 1
!
:
Then, at stage 2 the manager of rm 1, having taken into aount the response of the
manager of rm 2 at stage 3, would seek to maximize his objetive funtion
u
1
(q
1
) = (a  f(q
1
)  f(q
2
(q
1
))  )q
1
+ a
1
q
1
:
9
A straightforward alulation gives
q
H
1
(a
1
; a
2
) = f
 1
 
(n+ 1   )(a  )  a
2
+ (n + 1)a
1
(n+ 1)(n + 1  
2
)
!
and onsequently
q
H
2
(a
1
; a
2
) = f
 1
 
[(n+ 1)
2
  (n + 1)   n
2
℄(a  )  (n+ 1)a
1
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
+
[(n+ 1)
2
  n
2
℄a
2
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
!
:
At stage 3 the owners of the two rms simultaneously solve their respetive maxi-
mization problems
max
a
1
0

1
(a
1
; a
2
) ; max
a
2
0

2
(a
1
; a
2
)
where

1
(a
1
; a
2
) = (a  f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))  f(q
2
(a
1
; a
2
))  )q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
= (a  f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))  r
2
(f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)))  )q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
with
r
2
(t) =
a  + a
2
  t
n+ 1
from equation (6.1.7) and

2
(a
1
; a
2
) = (a  f(q
2
(a
1
; a
2
))  f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))  )q
2
(a
1
; a
2
) :
Beause of (6.1.3) applied for i = j = 1
#
1
#a
1
= ( 
#f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))
#a
1
  
dr
2
df(q
1
)
#f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))
#a
1
)q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
+(a  f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))  r
2
(f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)))  )
#q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
#a
1
=
 
 
df(q
1
)
dq
1
  
dr
2
df(q
1
)
df(q
1
)
dq
1
!
#q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
#a
1
q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
+(a  f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
))  r
2
(f(q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)))  )
#q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
#a
1
=
  
 
df(q
1
)
dq
1
  
df(q
2
(q
1
))
dq
1
!
q
1
+ (a  f(q
1
)  f(q
2
(q
1
))  )
!
#q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
#a
1
=
d
1
(q
1
)
dq
1
#q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
#a
1
=  a
1
#q
1
(a
1
; a
2
)
#a
1
< 0
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therefore, 
1
(a
1
; a
2
) is a dereasing funtion of a
1
taking its maximumvalue at a
H
1
= 0.
Taking this into aount 
2
(a
1
; a
2
) beomes

2
(a
2
) =
 
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)(a  )
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
+
 (n+ 1)(n + 1  )(a  ) + 
2
(n+ 1)a
2
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
+
 [(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄(a  )  [(n+ 1)
2
  n
2
℄a
2
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
!
q
2
(0; a
2
) :
The rst order ondition following a lengthy, albeit straightforward, alulation gives
a
H
2
=
[(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄n(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1)[(n + 1)
2
  (2n+ 1)
2
℄[(n+ 1)
2
  n
2
℄
(a  ) :(6.1.8)
One veries diretly that
a
G
1
= a
H
2
> a
G
2
> a
H
1
= 0
proving the rst part of the Theorem 2.1. For the seond part we alulate p
G
i
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
)
and p
H
i
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
) for i = 1; 2.
p
G
1
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
) = a  f(q
1
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
))  f(q
2
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
))  
=
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(a  )  (n+ 1   )(a  )  (n+ 1)a
G
1
+ a
G
2
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
 
(n+ 1  )(a  ) + (n + 1)a
G
2
  a
G
1
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
=
n(n+ 1   )(a  ) + (
2
  n   1)a
G
1
  na
G
2
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
;
p
G
2
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
) = a  f(q
1
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
))  f(q
2
(a
G
1
; a
G
2
))  
=
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(a  )  (n+ 1   )(a  )  (n+ 1)a
G
1
+ 
2
a
G
2
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
 
(n+ 1  )(a  ) + (n+ 1)a
G
2
  a
G
1
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
=
n(n+ 1   )(a  )  na
G
1
+ (
2
  n  1)a
G
2
(n+ 1)
2
  
2
:
Also,
p
H
1
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
) = a  f(q
1
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
))  f(q
2
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
))  
=
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)(a  )
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
 
(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )(a  )  (n+ 1)a
H
2
+ (n+ 1)
2
a
H
1
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
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 [(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄(a  )  (n + 1)
2
a
H
1
+ [(n+ 1)
2
  n
2
℄a
H
2
(n+ 1)
2
(n + 1  
2
)
=
[n(n+ 1)
2
  n(n+ 1)( + 1) + n
3
℄(a  )
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
+
(n+ 1)(
2
  n  1)a
H
1
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
+
n(
2
  n  1)a
H
2
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
;
and
p
H
2
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
) = a  f(q
1
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
))  f(q
2
(a
H
1
; a
H
2
))  
=
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)(a  )
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
 
(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )(a  )  
2
(n+ 1)a
H
2
+ (n + 1)
2
a
H
1
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
 
[(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄(a  )  (n + 1)a
H
1
+ [(n+ 1)
2
  n
2
℄a
H
2
(n + 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
=
n[(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄(a  )
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)
 
n(n + 1)a
H
1
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
+
[(2n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)
2
℄a
H
2
(n + 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
:
The rst part of Theorem 2.1, i.e.
a
H
1
= 0 ; ; a
H
2
= a
G
1
=
n(n+ 1)
2


1
(a  )
(n+ 1)

;
implies that
p
G
1
=
n(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)(n+ 1  )

[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  )
+
 n(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)
2

2


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  )
+
 n
2
(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )
3

 + n
3
(n+ 1)
6


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)

(a  ) ;
p
G
2
=
n(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   )(n + 1  
2
)

[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
+
 n
2
(n + 1)
3
(n+ 1  
2
)
3


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
+
 n(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )(n+ 1  
2
)
2

 + n
2
(n+ 1)(n+ 1   
2
)
5


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
12
and
p
H
1
=
(n + 1)[n(n+ 1)
2
  n(n+ 1)( + 1) + n
3
℄

(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
+
 n
2
(n+ 1)(n + 1  
2
)
3


1
(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  ) ;
p
H
2
=
n(n+ 1)[(n+ 1)
2
  (n+ 1)   n
2
℄

(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
(a  )
+
n(n+ 1)[(2n + 1)
2
  (n+ 1)
2
℄
2


1
(n + 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)
(a  ) :
By omparing the oeÆients of 
 and 

1
one diretly establishes
p
G
1
= p
H
2
and p
G
2
= p
H
1
proving half of Theorem 2.1(ii).
To the end of proving the remaining half of Theorem 2.1(ii), we observe that
f(q
G
1
) =
(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   )(n+ 1  
2
)
 + n(n+ 1)
3
(n + 1  
2
)
2


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1   
2
)(n + 1)
2


(a  )
 
n(n+ 1   )
2

   n
2

5


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1  
2
)(n+ 1)
2


(a  ) ;
f(q
G
2
) =
(n + 1)
2
(n+ 1  )(n+ 1   
2
)

[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1   
2
)(n+ 1)
2


(a  )
+
n(n+ 1)(n + 1  )
2

  n
2
(n+ 1)
5


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1   
2
)(n+ 1)
2


(a  )
 
n(n+ 1)
2
(n + 1  
2
)
2


1
[(n+ 1)
2
  
2
℄(n+ 1  
2
)(n+ 1)
2


(a  ) :
For q
H
i
; 1 = 1; 2, we get
f(q
H
1
) =
"
(n+ 1)(n+ 1   )

(n+ 1)
2
(n+ 1   
2
)

  
n(n+ 1)
2


1
(n + 1)
2
(n+ 1  
2
)

#
(a  ) ;
f(q
H
2
) =
(n+ 1)[(n+ 1)(n+ 1   
2
)  (n+ 1   )℄

(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1   
2
)

(a  )
+
n(n+ 1)[(n+ 1)(n+ 1  
2
) + 
2
℄
2


1
(n+ 1)
3
(n+ 1  
2
)

(a  ) :
By omparing, one more, the oeÆients of 
 and 

1
in the above formulae and
beause f is 1{1 one diretly establishes
q
G
1
= q
H
2
and q
G
2
= q
H
1
whih ompletes the proof of Theorem 2.1(ii).
The proof of Theorem 2.1(iii) follows, now, immediately.
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